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I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer system associated with European football' is completely
unique from any other form of American sports.2 Unlike American sports
where players are drafted, traded, and signed via free agency, European
football players are bought and sold for substantial amounts of money.3
This system has undergone tremendous amounts of change in recent time,
and while these changes have remedied many issues, they have also created
others.4 The original system was set up in such a way that players could
* B.A., Florida State University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center, May 2015.
1. In this Note, "football" refers to the British term for soccer.
2. See The Center for the Law and the Economics of Sport, THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF TRANSFERS PLAYERS 1 (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/f-
studies/study-transfers-final-rpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
3. Paris Saint-Germain Dream into Action, THE Swiss RAMBLER (July 18, 2012),
http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2012/07/paris-saint-germain-dream-into-action.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2013).
4. See The Center For the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 4.
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potentially be bound for life to whichever team they originally signed with.5
Teams were also limited by league rules to the amount of foreign players
that could be on their rosters at any one time.
The new transfer system has greatly increased players' rights in
contractual negotiations and allowed for virtually unlimited player
movement throughout the European Union (EU). While the changes have
been incredibly advantageous for the players, these changes have resulted
in an exponential increase in team expenditures.' The transfer fees
associated with the world's top players have also risen to such a level that
only a handful of teams are able to remain competitive.9
The most controversial and well-documented transfer in history was
that of Cristiano Ronaldo. In June 2010, the Portuguese forward was sold
from Manchester United to Real Madrid for a record £80 million, or $141
million.10 This staggering amount of money does not cover any of
Ronaldo's roughly $450,000 a week salary." While Ronaldo's salary alone
is not significantly higher than those of other sports stars such as Lebron
James ($17.5 million) 12 or Peyton Manning ($20 million)," neither one of
their organizations paid $141 million just to bring them to the team. 14 It
quickly became apparent why football clubs spend astonishing amounts of
money on player wages.
5. See Peter N. Katz, A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain:
Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 402 (1994).
6. Jesse Gary, The Demise of Sport? The Effect of Judicially Mandated Free Agency on
European Football and American Baseball, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293, 298 (2005).
7. Id. at 295.
8. Paris Saint-Germain Dream into Action, supra note 3.
9. The Center For the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 226.
10. Mark Ogden, Cristiano Ronaldo Transfer: Real Madrid Agree £80 Million Fee with
Manchester United, THE TELEGRAPH (June 11, 2009, 9:30 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-united/5505073/Cristiano-Ronaldo-
transfer-Real-Madrid-agree-80-million-fee-with-Manchester-United.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
11. The Celebrity 100, FORBES (June 2013), http://www.forbes.com/profile/cristiano-ronaldo/
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (based on his $23 million annual salary which when divided by fifty-two
equals $442,307).
12. Ben Golliver, LeBron James Passes Kobe Bryant on SI's 'Fortunate 50' Highest-Earning
Athletes List, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 15, 2013), http://nba.si.com/2013/05/15/lebron-james-passes-
kobe-bryant-on-sis-fortunate-50-highest-eaming-athletes-list/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
13. Lindsey H. Jones, Peyton Manning, Broncos Restructure Contract, USA TODAY (May 17,
2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/broncos/2013/05/17/peyton-manning-
broncos-contract-restructure/2193609/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
14. Id.; Golliver, supra note 12.
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By 2010, these "transfer fees"s had become so high that despite
record revenues across the continent, the total debt of European clubs had
risen to E1.6 billion.16  Around the same time, European football
represented a C16.3 billion market in Europe, which constituted a forty-two
percent increase from 2006.'1 According to European football's governing
body, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the percentage
of clubs reporting operating losses in 2011 had increased to a staggering
sixty-three percent." This dramatic increase in debt occurred despite an
increase in club revenue each year over the same time period. 9
As player wages continue to rise, so does the gap in competition. The
staggering amount of money teams must presently spend to remain
competitive has created a small group of teams that dominate each year.
The disparity grows as players become more expensive. This ever-
increasing "arms race" has been fueled by the tremendous influx of foreign
investors and billionaire owners. 20 These wealthy benefactors have enabled
their respective teams to spend well beyond their capacity, which further
undermines their club's financial stability.21 In recent years, there has been
a movement to curtail these irresponsible spending habits and force teams
to balance their spending.22 The passage of the Financial Fair Play
Regulations (FFP) in 2010 was the first step towards improving teams'
long-term economic viability. 23 This regulation will require teams to
balance their income and expenditures. 24 Each team's wage budget cannot
exceed the revenue they generate through gate receipts, television, and
15. The term "transfer fee" refers to the price one team pays another team to gain the rights to
a player. This fee does not include the player's wages. See The Center For the Law and the Economics
ofSport, supra note 2, at 20.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 23.
18. SEFTON PERRY & STEPHANIE LEACH, THE EUROPEAN CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING
REPORT 101 (2012), available at
http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/resources/UEFA%20Club%2OLicensing%2OBenchmarking
%20January%/o20201 1.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
19. Id.
20. The Center For the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 229.
21. Id.
22. See UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATIONS, UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND
FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/Clublicensing/01/50/09/12/1500912_DOWN
LOAD.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 33.
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marketing. 25 Teams that do not abide by these rules face varying levels of
penalties from fines to banishment from UEFA competitions.2 6
It is the purpose of this Note to describe the current situation in the
European football transfer system and the changes needed to ensure the
game's long-term economic sustainability. Part I of this Note will examine
the history of the transfer system and the cases that have led the system to
where it is today. Part II will focus on the current economic situation and
how the current spending habits of teams are affecting the sport's long-term
success. Lastly, Part III will focus on the implementation of the FFP, the
changes that it will bring, and the need to implement a salary cap system
into European football.
II. HISTORY OF THE TRANSFER MARKET
The beginnings of the transfer system coincide directly with the
origins of football itself.2 7 In 1863, a small group of English clubs formed
what is still known today as the Football Association (FA) and began to
establish formal rules for the sport. 28 As more players became full-time
professionals, the owners sought to gain further control over their
increasing wages.29  This led to the establishment of the "Retain and
Transfer Rule."30 This system was originally established to prevent wealthy
clubs from monopolizing all of the league's best talent.3' Clubs were
required to register players with the FA each season.32 These players and
their contracts then became tradable commodities between the different
clubs.33
Under this system, when a player's contract expired, an option period
began that was controlled entirely by the club.34 The option contract could
last as long as the player's original contract. 5 Since original contracts were
25. Id.
26. Financial Fair Play Explained, FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY (July 31, 2013),
http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/financial-fair-play-explained.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
27. Gary, supra note 6, at 297.
28. Id.
29. Katz, supra note 5, at 400.
30. Gary, supra note 6, at 297.
31. See id.
32. STEPHEN DOBSON & JOHN A. GODDARD, THE EcoNOMICS OF FOOTBALL 90 (Cambridge
University Press 2001).
33. Id.
34. Katz, supra note 5, at 401.
35. See id.
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not restricted as to length, a player may be bound for the rest of his career
to whichever club originally signed him, without any possibility of
negotiating a new agreement.36 This meant that in theory, and sometimes in
practice, clubs could prevent players who refused to sign this option
contract from playing anywhere else for the rest of their careers.37
Under this system, other teams were allowed to sign players from their
current club if they reimbursed the club for the remaining value of the
38player's contract.38 This clause essentially rendered this occurrence
nonexistent. While this system drastically limited a player's ability to move
freely within the market, it did allow smaller clubs to retain their talented
players and prevented larger, wealthier clubs from sniping off the best
talent and destroying the league's competitive nature.3 9
As globalization began to creep into the game, the FA implemented
limits on the number of foreign players allowed on a club's roster.40 Other
leagues began to introduce similar regulations in order to maintain their
league's national identity and preserve the parity of the international
game.4 1 While the intentions may have been well founded, these
regulations greatly limited the ability of players to play throughout the rest
of Europe.
A. Cases that Altered the Transfer System
1. Eastham v. Newcastle Football Club
George Eastham was a professional football player that played for
Newcastle United from 1956 to 1960.42 In 1959, with his contract
approaching expiration, Eastham refused to sign a new one and requested a
transfer; however, Newcastle refused to let him go. 4 3 Eastham was quoted
referring to the Retain and Transfer system:
Our contract could bind us to a club for life. Most people called
it the slavery contract. We had virtually no rights at all. It was
36. Id. at 402.
37. DOBSON & GODDARD, supra note 32, at 90.
38. Gary, supra note 6, at 297.
39. Id. at 298.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Arsenal's Greatest Midfielders: Early Era's Vote Time, ARSENAL ARSENAL (June 29,
2013), http://arsenalarsenal.wordpress.com/tag/george-eastham/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter
Arsenal's Greatest Midfielders].
43. Id.
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often the case that the guy on the terrace not only earned more
than us-though there's nothing wrong with that-he had more
freedom of movement than us. People in business or teaching
were able to hand in their notice and move on. We weren't. That
44was wrong.
Despite Newcastle United eventually granting his request to transfer,
Eastham took his case to the High Court (of England) in 1963 to dispute the
system as a whole.4 5 Eastham sought a declaration that the retention and
transfer system should not be allowed because the system was an unlawful
restraint on trade.46 The Chancery Division held that the retention
provisions of the system interfered with a player's right to seek
employment and therefore could not be upheld.47 While this case did not
overturn the limits on foreign players, it greatly increased a player's
negotiating power.
2. Union Royale des Socidtis Defendant Football Association ASBL v.
Bosman
The transfer system was drastically altered after the landmark decision
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Union Royale des Socidtis
defendant Football Association ASBL v. Bosman48 in 1995.49 Jean-Marc
Bosman was a Belgian football player who played for RC Liege from 1988
to 1990.0 When his contract expired in 1990, Bosman had fallen out of
favor with the team and the team placed a fee of £500,000 on him." This
fee was more than five times what RC Liege paid for him just two years
prior.52 When the French team, US Dunkirk, approached RC Liege about
purchasing Bosman, RC Liege insisted the team pay the entire fee upfront.
When the team refused, RC Liege pulled out of the deal and cut Bosman's
44. JON SPURLING, REBELS FOR THE CAUSE 81 (Mainstream Publishing 2004).
45. Arsenal's Greatest Midfielders, supra note 42.
46. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd., [1964] 1 ch. at 414 (Eng.).
47. See id. at 414.
48. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Socidtds de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman,
1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R 645 (1995).
49. Gary, supra note 6, at 294.
50. Id. at 301.
51. Mark Burton, Who is Jean-Marc Bosman?, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 21, 1995),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/who-is-jeanmarc-bosman-1602219.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
52. See id.
53. Id.
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salary by seventy-five percent to just £500 per month.s4 Bosman refused to
sign this meager contract and brought suit against UEFA and RC Lidge.s
Bosman went to court seeking a declaration that the nationality clauses of
each league violated the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (ECC).
In Bosman, the ECJ held that the transfer fee system and its rule
limiting the number of foreign players a club could field at a time violated
Article 48 of the EEC.57 Article 48 of the EEC governs the freedom of
movement for workers within the European Community (EC). 8 The Court
recognized that while there was no absolute ban on foreign players, the
league's rules preventing teams from fielding more than three such players
for a match significantly limited a player's opportunities; therefore, they
constituted unlawful discrimination of EC members.59
UEFA argued against this ruling claiming that these
provisions had legitimate purposes, such as:
1) To field a team representative of the local population;
2) To develop a local pool of talent from which the national
team could select players from; and
3) To maintain parity within the league.60
The Court disregarded these arguments stating that the protection of
nationalism as a means of "enabling the public to identify with its favorite
team" was illogical given the absence of similar regulations ensuring
proportional representation of residents hailing from a team's "locality,
town, region or ... territory."61 Further, the employment of foreign players
did not compromise their eligibility to play for their respective national
teams; and finally, that restrictions on foreign players had little or no effect
on a league's parity because the wealthy clubs were already using their
influence to lure the best domestic players to their clubs.62
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 48, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S 11, 36 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
57. Gary, supra note 6, at 301.
58. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 147; see EEC Treaty, supra note 56, art. 48.
59. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 127-29.
60. Id. T 123-25.
61. Id. 1 123, 131.
62. Seeid. %131-35.
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In actuality, this ruling meant that when a player's contract ended he
was no longer at the mercy of his current club and was free to sign with
another team in any country he desired. The fallout from the ruling was
chaotic at best. UEFA essentially ignored the ruling and maintained its
current transfer system and its limitations on foreign players. 4 In March
2011, an agreement was eventually reached between Mario Monti, the new
head of the EU Competition Committee, and Sepp Blatter, the head of the
F6d6ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). The agreement
maintained much of the current transfer system but completely did away
with the reserve system and allowed for an unlimited number of EU players
to be on a team's roster.66
B. The Impact and Expansion of the Bosman Ruling
UEFA, FIFA, and most European teams argued that this ruling would
greatly diminish a club's income.67 This, however, did not come to fruition
because the ECJ's ruling in Bosman applied only to those transfer fees
associated with players whose contracts had already expired. Almost
ninety percent of transfer revenue came from transfers that occurred while a
player was still under contract.6 9 Therefore, this decision did not have the
far-reaching impact that many clubs had predicted.
Later, the case of Deutscher Handball Bunde v. Maros Kopak7o
expanded the Bosman ruling to eastern European nations as well as several
North African nations.7 1 The ECJ reasoned that any country that had
Association Agreements with the EU should be subject to the same rules as
the actual members of the EU.72 The expansion of the Bosman ruling
sparked a widespread belief that the football leagues of the EU's wealthier
nations would be flooded with players from poorer countries who would
agree to work for much lower wages than their domestic counterparts. 73
63. Gary, supra note 6, at 295.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Gary, supra note 6, at 322.
68. Id. at 304.
69. Id.
70. Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handball bunde v. Maros Kopak, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4135 (2003).
71. Id.134.
72. See id.; see Gary, supra note 6, at 322.
73. See Gary, supra note 6, at 322.
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In reference to a similar ruling in France,7 4 Jean-Jacques Amorfini, a
member of France's players union, stated: "A lot of players from Eastern
European countries could be interested in joining French clubs for almost
nothing. We already have enough jobless players not to create some
more." 75 The number of foreign players in the various football leagues of
Europe has climbed to record levels, with roughly thirty-six percent being
non-native in the leagues in which they play, according to today's
research.76
It is impossible not to see the impact that the Bosman ruling has had on
professional sports in Europe. This decision has given players a far greater
bargaining position in contract negotiations. As a result, both the number
of foreign players in each league and the overall wages of each club have
increased exponentially.77 In the year prior to the ruling, clubs from Italy's
top league, Serie A, and England's top league, the English Premier League,
spent on average £15 million a year on player wages.78 As of 2010, this
figure almost tripled for both leagues to approximately 645 million per
club.79
The Bosman ruling opened the doors for players from across the EU as
well as the rest of the world to play wherever they wanted. In 1994, the
year before Bosman, there were eighteen French footballers in the four
major leagues, i.e., in England, Germany, Italy, and Spain.80 By the year
1998, this number had swelled to 100.8' This illustrates just how restrictive
the limitations on player movement were up until this landmark decision.
While some still argue that this decision has led to a diminished level of
football at the national team level, it is difficult to argue with the drastically
increased revenue that has consistently gone up each of the last twelve
years.
74. See generally Malaja v. Federation de Basketball, Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest
administrative court] Dec. 30. 2002, Rec. Lebon 485 (Fr.).
75. International Roundup: French Union Calls for Additions to "Malaja" Rule, REUTERS
(Feb. 27, 2003, 1:00 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2003/02/27/int rdp/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).
76. Nick Harris, Foreign Players at Record Levels Across European Football, SPORTING
INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 21, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2013/01/21/new-
research-foreign-players-at-record-levels-across-european-football-210102/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
77. The Center for the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 127-30.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 127.
81. Id.
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III. CURRENT EcoNOMIC UNCERTAINTY
Today, football enjoys extraordinary levels of success and popularity,
but the overall well being of the modem game is much less optimistic.
Sport is an incredibly powerful social phenomenon, linked to both
mediatization and globalization over the past thirty years.82 Over 101
million supporters attended the top European domestic league matches in
2011 . A club like Manchester United estimates that it has as many as 659
million fans throughout the world.84 Nowadays, it seems difficult for
anything to match the popularity of either the game or its biggest clubs.
When the 2006 FIFA World Cup was held in Germany, 376 channels
broadcasted the matches, and the total cumulative television audience for
all matches was an astonishing 26.3 billion."
This global popularity has shown as European football accounted for
C16.3 billion in revenue during the 2010-2011 season. 86  Despite these
historic levels, the majority of the clubs are experiencing severe economic
difficulties. While the level of revenue has increased exponentially, so
has the pressure to spend exorbitant amounts of money in order for the
clubs to remain competitive. During the 1994 season, there were a total of
5735 transfers that accounted for a total of E402,860,000.89 During the
2010 season, there were a total of 18,307 transfers, accounting for a total of
C3,002,198,000.90
This runaway spending has created a snowball effect-forcing teams
to spend outrageous amounts of money to remain competitive. Teams that
cannot afford to spend at this rate are compelled to either accept mediocrity
or spend themselves into debt with hopes that their expected success will
result in increased revenue. While revenue is increasing, it is unable to
keep pace with the overwhelming expenditures. 91 The revenue of the first
82. The Center for the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 25.
83. Id.
84. Mike Ozanian, Manchester United Claims to Have 659 Million Supporters, FORBES (May
29, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/05/29/manchester-united-claims-
to-have-659-million-supporters/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
85. FtDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, No. I SPORTS EVENT 1
(2012), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/ffprojects/ip-401_06e-tv2658.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
86. The Center for the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 23.
87. Id. at4.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Paris Saint-Germain Dream into Action, supra note 3.
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fifty-three UEFA member countries has increased from C9 billion in 2006
to E16.3 billion in 2010.92 But overall, net losses increased steadily over
the same period to reach C1.64 billion in 2010.93
The reason for this lack of financial discipline was well summarized in
the 2010-2012 House of Commons report on Football Governance:
Club owners are generally over optimistic about their
management abilities and vision for a club . . . . All academic
evidence is that there is a very strong correlation between squad
wages and points won, something, which is obvious to owners.
There is a natural tendency to borrow in the pursuit of success,
although ... not all teams can be successful .... There are many
examples of clubs where the directors (even true fans) have
'chased the dream'-gambling short-term investment (or
borrowing) in the hope of long-term success-but actually
achieving the opposite. The pressure on the directors of a club to
invest, to si na star player .. . is often immense from ordinary
supporters.
Even the most profitable leagues in Europe are experiencing periods of
tremendous economic turmoil.9 5  The top three-the English Premier
League, Italian Serie A, and Spanish La Liga-are all in serious debt.
Specifically, the English Premier League, which is widely regarded as the
world's best league, has a total debt of £3.1 billion. 7 Spanish La Liga and
Italian Serie A come in a close second and third with £3 billion and E2.1
billion of debt, respectively.98
92. The Center for the Law and the Economics of Sport, supra note 2, at 119 tbl.2 (Top
Division Net Profit).
93. Id.
94. DCMS SELECT COMMITrEE, FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE-CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT
COMMITTEE, 2011, H.C. 792-1, 3(2), (4) (U.K.).
95. The Center for the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 166-67.
96. David Conn, Premier League Clubs Boast £3. 1bn ofDebt, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2009,
7:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/03/english-premier-league-debt/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013); Mario Pagliara, Serie A, a 62.6Billion Deficit Cost-benefit: Uncontrollable Losses,
GAZETTA DELLO SPORT (Mar. 29, 2012), http://english.gazzetta.it/Football/29-03-2012/serie-a-e26-
billion-deficit-cost-benefits-uncontrollable-losses-91770284951.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2013);
Owen Gibson, La Liga Debts Reach £3bn to Leave Spanish Game in Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (May 19,
2010, 6:28 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/19/la-liga-debt-passes-three-billion (last
visited Sept. 16, 2013).
97. Conn, supra note 96.
98. Pagliara, supra note 96; Gibson, supra note 96.
2013] 117
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The secondary effect of the financial model is the increasing gap in
competition. Historically, football has not been the most balanced sport in
terms of competition. Leagues have typically experienced periods of
dominance by a select number teams. 99 However, this current economic
climate has exacerbated this to a point where the majority of teams stand
little to no chance of competing in their own leagues.o00 The clubs from
smaller markets are simply incapable of competing either on the pitch or in
the transfer market with the more wealthy teams.' 0
A few teams dominate nearly every major European league.102 The
chasm that now exists between each league's top teams and the rest of the
league represents an impenetrable barrier for the smaller teams. 0 3 Unless
the current revenue-sharing system is amended, or a salary cap is put in
place, this gap will continue to grow.
A. The English Premier League
The English Premier League is a microcosm of the financial
uncertainty facing European football today. The league represents over
E2.5 billion in revenue by itself, and yet still boasts a debt level of E3.38
billion.104  This enormous spending level has led to a few of Europe's
wealthiest teams dominating the sport for over a decade. During the past
twelve seasons, the top three teams in the English Premier League, Serie A,
and La Liga have won thirty-four out of the possible thirty-six national
titles. 05  This runaway spending has led to a complete lack of parity
because only the wealthiest clubs are able to spend at a level that allows
them to remain competitive year in and year out.
Much of the English Premier League's debt can be attributed to a
small group of the league's most successful clubs.' 06 Chelsea Football Club
is a rather unique example of financial irresponsibility.'o7 The club's
owner, Roman Abramovich, has lent the club a staggering £701 million
99. The Center for the Law and the Economics ofSport, supra note 2, at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 7 tbl.1 (percentage of national titles won by the three most successful teams).
103. The Center for the Law and the Economics of Sport, supra note 2, at 166-67 (this amount
is a conversion from pounds to euros).
104. Id. at 7.
105. See generally Conn, supra note 96.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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since he purchased the club in 2003.108 While the Russian billionaire is not
requiring the club to pay interest on these loans, the club is still liable to pay
back this tremendous amount of money.'0 9 This will place a significant
burden on the club for the foreseeable future since this debt amounts to
more than three times their yearly revenue of E261 million. 0
Accounting for the debt of three of the league's wealthiest teams,
Chelsea, Manchester United, and Arsenal, amounts to an astronomical
£1.36 billion."' Chelsea and Manchester City have both come under the
ownership of foreign billionaires. These owners have injected hundreds of
millions of dollars into their respective clubs.1 2 Both of these teams have
seen increased revenues since the change in ownership, but neither team
makes enough to offset their players' salaries." 3
To put this irresponsible spending in perspective, of the thirty-two
teams in the National Football League (NFL), only three teams, the
Oakland Raiders, Pittsburg Steelers, and Detroit Lions, do not maintain an
operating profit. 114 These three teams, however, only combined for a net
loss of $20.4 million for the 2012 season."' 5  These losses are miniscule
compared to each of the team's value, and they were mainly due to a large
percentage of contractual obligations becoming due during that particular
season.116
This lack of responsible fiscal management has rendered the English
Premier League completely void of any form of parity. Of the last twenty-
one league titles, the League's three most dominant teams have won
nineteen: Manchester United (13); Chelsea (3); and Arsenal (3).1 17 These
powerhouses have been able to dominate the League and consistently
generate exponentially more revenue than their opponents from smaller
markets.'18 The vicious cycle has forced other teams to spend beyond their
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Conn, supra note 96.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Mike Ozanian, Kurt Badenhausen & Christina Settimi, NFL Team Values, FORBES (Sept.
5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. History of the Premier League, PREMIER LEAGUE (July 30, 2013),
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means in order to maintain the hopes of winning what appears to be a losing
battle.
While the English Premier League is no more at fault than any of the
other financially irresponsible leagues, it is a good example of the problems
affecting nearly every major football league in Europe. Despite record
levels of revenue, the pressure to remain competitive and compete for
championships has led to many teams spending millions more than they can
afford year after year."'9 The teams from larger markets and those with
wealthy owners are essentially able to buy their way into championships.120
Some spectators argue that while there is a clear lack of competitive
fairness in modern soccer, it actually makes the game more exciting for
fans.121 Economist Jack Hirshleifer calls the phenomenon "the paradox of
power." 22  Fans always enjoy the David versus Goliath match; even
seemingly disinterested fans love to cheer for the overmatched team.
While this paradox may certainly be true in some situations, compare
the English Premier League with the NFL. The NFL is the most profitable
sports league on the planet and has by far the highest average attendance of
any sport.123 The NFL attracts an average of 68,241 people to each game,
while the English Premier League only manages 35,341.124 When people
attempt to explain the NFL's unrivaled success, they often mention the
leagues motto: "On any given Sunday any team in our league can beat any
other team." 25 This motto would certainly not hold true for the English
Premier League, with its three top teams dominating the last quarter of a
century.12 6 While the English Premier League's revenue sharing is much
more generous than its Italian and Spanish counterparts, it is completely
overshadowed by the NFL. The NFL shares television income equally,
forty percent of each game's gate receipts go to the visiting team and only
one thirteenth of merchandise profit is kept by the respective team.127
While no system or league is perfect, the English Premier League could
certainly take a few pages out of the playbook of American sports.
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B. La Liga
While La Liga of Spain does not garner as much attention as their
neighbor to the north, this league is certainly not without their own
financial difficulties. Spain has been the dominant force in world football
for the past five years, winning two UEFA European Championships and
one FIFA World Cup.128  The country's two most successful teams,
Barcelona and Real Madrid, are ranked first and fourth respectively in the
world.129 However, this success has not resulted in financial prosperity for
their domestic league.130 Despite their success both at home and abroad, La
Liga is one of the most financially embattled leagues in the world. Miguel
Cardenal, the President of the Spanish Sports Council, stated recently that
the collective debt of all the clubs is now beyond E4 billion."' Of that,
E670 million, or $874 million, is owed to the tax authority.132
To illustrate how severe this pecuniary crisis is, take Valencia CF, for
example. This club has been very successful throughout its history; in
2007, it began construction on a world-class, 75,000 seat stadium.133 In
2009, after investing over $250 million into the project, the construction
was halted when the club was unable to further finance the project.134 The
bank, which the club owed most of its debt to, agreed to help finish the
construction so that the club could begin to generate revenue from the new
stadium.'35 Even this venture would not succeed, because only a year later,
the bank had to be nationalized due to its own financial difficulties, and the
project was again suspended.' 36 Valencia CF was forced to sell off nearly
all of its most valuable players to alleviate its financial imbalance.137
Much like the English Premier League, La Liga's lack of competitive
fairness has exacerbated the economic situations of the league's smaller
clubs. Barcelona and Real Madrid have combined to win all but three of
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the La Liga championships since 1996.138 The monopoly that these two
clubs have over the league has led to the bullying of the other Spanish
teams.139  Under the current television agreement, Barcelona and Real
Madrid share thirty-four percent of the total television revenues (E140
million each), while the other forty teams in the top two divisions share the
remaining sixty-six percent (E12 million each).140 This discrepancy is far
greater than in any other major European league.141
The pressure to rectify this situation is escalating from both the
Spanish and German governments. German fans have been incensed that
their teams are being beaten by Spanish clubs, which are effectively
subsidized by tax breaks at a time when taxpayers believe they are paying
to help Spain bail out the country's debt-stricken banks.14 2  When the
Spanish government suggested they might forgive many clubs' tax debts,
the president of Germany's most dominant team, Bayern Munich,
responded, "this is the last straw, it's unbelievable . . . . We pay them
hundreds of millions of Euros to help get them out of the shit and then
Spain's clubs don't pay their debts." 4 3  Professor Jos6 Maria Gay de
Lidbana of the University of Barcelona also stated:
Reckless lending-especially by former savings banks controlled
by local politicians-had created a bubble that must eventually
burst. When people ask me what clubs could be in danger, I
reply with the list of the only clubs that are not in any kind of
danger. They are Barcelona, Real Madrid and Athletic Bilbao.
Hoeness (President of Bayern Munich) is, basically, right. If I
don't pay my taxes, then the authorities come after me. But that
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doesn't hapgen to the clubs, which are not treated like other
companies.
The Spanish mess is a primary reason why Michel Platini, the
president of UEFA, has implemented the FFP rule.145 This policy, which
goes into effect next season, will affect the Spanish clubs of La Liga more
than any other league.14 6 Clubs that spend more on player wages than they
take in each year could potentially be expelled from the Champions League
or the Europa League.14 7 Miguel Cardenal has begun to remind clubs of the
ramifications their spending habits will have on both the league and its
teams.1 48 He has acknowledged the fact that Spain will have to begin
exporting most of its talented players in order to claw out of the financial
crater they have put themselves in.149
Spain, perhaps more so than any other nation, is in desperate need of a
salary cap. The league is dominated by two teams whose combined
incomes dwarf the rest of the league.150 Therefore, the league is left with a
system where two teams earn the most revenue and consistently win the
championship year after year. While the new FFP was implemented to
facilitate some sense of parity into the leagues, this rule will not solve the
problems in Spain. The FFP only makes teams keep their spending to the
same level as their income. Because Barcelona and Real Madrid have such
higher levels of revenue than the rest of La Liga, they will continue to
spend exponentially more money than any of their domestic counterparts.
Imbalance in football is not a new concept. The old European Cup
was seldom much fairer than the modern Champions League.152 Today's
inequality in football bothers fans not because it is unprecedented, but
because it is more of a product of financial imbalance than it used to be.'
In the past, a smaller club could experience years of success if it happened
144. Giles Tremlett, EU Prepares to Blow Final Whistle on Spain's Debt-ridden Football
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to sign a wonderful young player or hire an excellent up-and-coming
manager.' 54  That occurrence is all but extinct from modem football. 55
Today, a smaller team can seemingly only enjoy success if a foreign
billionaire purchases it, as is the case with both Chelsea and Manchester
City.15 6 Fans will not cry foul if a team is perennially winning because of
solid management and player development. They will cry foul, however,
when a team's success is built upon the unsettled foundation of a foreign
billionaire or quickly dissolving banks. 1
IV. INTRODUCTION OF THE FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES AND THE
NECESSITY OF A SALARY CAP
In September 2009, Michel Platini, announced that something was
finally going to be done about the arms race in European football.'18
UEFA's Executive Committee unanimously approved the FFP.'"9 The rule
was formally implemented in 2012 to try and repair some of the financial
damage done to the game.160 The major objectives were to encourage clubs
to compete within their revenues, to protect the long-term viability of the
game, and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities in a timely manner.161
UEFA acknowledged that despite the increased levels of income, many
clubs were experiencing repeated and worsening financial loses.16 2 Over
time, the regulation will force clubs to balance their books or face harsh
penalties. 63  Some of these penalties include: Fines, withholding of
television revenue, and exclusion from UEFA competitions.' 6 However,
despite clubs blatantly ignoring this policy and continuing to spend at
record levels, UEFA has yet to fully initiate the so-called "break even rule"
and has yet to hand out any significant punishment. 6 5
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The FFP contains numerous cracks that are beginning to show
through.16 6 One of the major criticisms of the FFP is the possibility of
solidifying the so-called "big clubs," which generate the largest revenues
and earn the most profits, and therefore, can spend more money on
transfers.16 7 Other commentators are concerned about possible loopholes in
the legislation itself.168 For example, up until the end of the 2014-2015
season, clubs will be allowed to exclude the wages of players signed before
June 2010 from the FFP calculation as long as they can show an improved
trend in their accounts. 69  Larger clubs are also able to artificially raise
their income from massive sponsorship deals, e.g., stadium naming rights
via companies with a vested interest in the club's success, or from the sales
of overseas rights to consortiums without clearly identified investors.7
Perhaps the two largest challenges to the success of the FFP are third-
party ownership and wealthy benefactors. Under the third-party ownership
model, companies or wealthy individuals can purchase a percentage of a
young player in the hopes that if his value increases in the future, they will
make a profit based on their percentage. The advantage for clubs is that
they can purchase players whom they would not normally be able to afford.
While the English Premier League has banned such practices, it is
permissible under the FFP."
Because of the growing number of wealthy benefactors, a number of
clubs across Europe are able to spend substantially more than they earn as a
result of the benevolence of their owners who make substantial financial
gifts to the club, either by paying off existing debt or by providing direct
injections of cash.172  In France's top division (Ligue 1), Paris Saint-
Germain (PSG) became the richest club in France, and one of the richest
clubs in the world, after Qatar Investment Authority became the majority
shareholder of the club after buying a controlling percentage of the shares
in 2011.17 They purchased the club in a deal worth E50 million, which
covered an estimated E15-20 million in debt and losses of C19 million from
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the 2010-2011 season.17 4 PSG splashed a French record E26 million and
were the biggest spenders in the world for the 2011-2012 season.17 ' These
enormous loopholes in the FFP regulations have allowed many clubs to
continue their reckless spending without facing any sanctions from UEFA.
However, the FFP alone will not be enough to remedy the current
economic situation. The FFP will do nothing to bring balance to leagues in
which only a handful of teams stand a chance of winning. Teams that wish
to claw into the upper echelon of their leagues will be forced to spend
beyond their means and will in turn be punished by UEFA for doing so.
While the FFP rules are a step in the right direction, more must be done in
order to truly rectify the problems facing football today.
A. The National Basketball Association's Salary Cap System
Most major American sports, with the exception of baseball, have a
salary cap system in place. The NFL and the National Basketball
Association (NBA) are the two most profitable leagues that utilize a salary
cap. 176 The revenue sharing and salary cap system in the NBA would be
well suited for European football.
Every team in the NBA must spend a minimum of $52.8 million and
can spend no more than $58.7 million.177 This small window of salary cap
space ensures that teams play on a relatively even field. The salary cap in
the NBA is what is known as a "soft cap." 178 While the NFL and National
Hockey League (NHL) have minimal exceptions for going over the cap, the
NBA will allow teams to do so for a number of reasons. The soft cap in the
NBA allows teams to exceed this cap, but those teams pay a "luxury tax"
when they do so.179
The 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) instituted major
changes to the luxury tax system. 80 The dollar for dollar tax provisions of
174. European Football and Debt Crisis: "Money Flowing to France," ICN (Aug. 22, 2013,
10:22 AM), https://www.icn.com/en/slidemewstype/2013/08/22/money-flowing-to-france/index.aspx
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
175. Paris Saint-Germain Dream into Action, supra note 3.
176. Golliver, supra note 12; NFL Estimated Salary Cap Room, OVER THE CAP,
http://overthecap.com/nfl-cap-space.php?year-2013 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
177. Grant Hughes, Report: NBA Salary Cap May Increase by $500k in 2013-14, BLEACHER
REPORT (June 3, 2013), http://bleachreport.com/articles/1659724-report-nba-salary-cap-may-increase-
by-500k-in-2013-14b (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 18-19 (2012).
[Vol. 20:1126
2013] Knight 127
the previous CBA remains in effect through the 2012-2013 season.18
Starting in the 2013-2014 season, the tax imposed on violators will change
to an incremental system.182 The tax will be assessed at different levels
based on the amount that a team is over the luxury tax threshold.183 For
example, a team that is $8 million over the tax threshold will pay $1.50 per
dollar for each of its first $5 million over the tax threshold and $1.75 per
dollar for the remaining $3 million.184 Starting in the 2014-2015 season,
repeat offenders will be subject to additional penalties.'85  In the first
season, repeat offenders from all previous three seasons will pay a stiffer
tax rate; from the 2015-2016 season beyond, teams paying taxes in three
out of four years will be subject to the higher repeater rate.' 86 The money
that these offenders pay is redistributed to the other teams in the League.' 87
So teams are able to exceed the salary cap if they can afford to do so, but in
doing so they are also giving away millions of dollars to the NBA's less
wealthy teams.
This system would be well suited for European football because no
matter what system is installed, certain teams such as Barcelona and
Manchester United will always be willing and able to spend more than the
competition. Similarly, in the NBA, teams such as the Los Angeles Lakers
and the New York Knicks, which have much higher revenue streams, are
willing to spend more on players. This type of system would allow the
large market teams in Europe to continue to spend at the levels they are
comfortable with, but would also give the smaller teams more of a fighting
chance. Wealthy teams like Barcelona could continue to spend based upon
their large revenue streams, but their excess spending would be
redistributed to all other Spanish teams who did not exceed this tax
threshold.
V. CONCLUSION
Europe represents the largest transfer market in the world of football.
It has the most successful and well-known clubs in the world, and the best
players are attracted to these European leagues. Its transfer system has
undergone tremendous changes since the Bosman ruling. While the
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expansion of players' rights has led to increased salaries and transfer fees, it
has also led to a decline in competitive equality. The Bosman decision, the
increase in football revenues, the internationalization of the game, the
arrival of rich financiers, and the explosion of television rights have
undoubtedly contributed to the increase in value and the number transfers
across all the European football leagues.
The sport can simply not continue in the manner it is operating today.
Teams are being artificially supported through wealthy owners and
substantial television revenue. Clubs are earning more money than they
ever have and should have no problem operating within their budgets.
Teams must begin to operate responsibly in order to ensure the long-term
viability of the sport. The passage of the FFP is a promising first step
towards improving the sport's finances, however, until UEFA actually
enforces the rules and regulations contained in the FFP, football will
continue to suffer from both a financial and sporting perspective.
Implementing a salary cap and luxury tax similar to the NBA would
benefit the sport in numerous ways. Forcing clubs to operate within a
league-mandated budget would ensure that all teams compete on a level
playing field. Football has lacked any real form of parity for over a decade,
and the implementation of a salary cap would begin to remedy this
situation. For those teams who could afford to spend well above this line,
the use of a luxury tax would ensure the other teams would also benefit
financially. None of these regulations could be introduced without certain
opposition. These changes would represent a drastic transformation to a
system that went largely unchanged for over 150 years. With the landmark
ruling in Bosman, however, these changes have become necessary for the
sport's continued success.
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